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Sensing, Territory, Population: Computation, Embodied Sensors, and Hamlet Control in the 
Vietnam War 
Oliver Belcher 
School of Government and International Affairs 
Durham University 
Abstract: This article analyses a mid-twentieth century computerized pacification reporting system, 
the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), used by the US military to measure hamlet-level security and 
development trends in the Vietnam War. The significance of the HES was its capacity to translate US 
Military Advisor observations of Vietnamese hamlet life into a machine-readable format used by US 
military systems analysts to disclose ‘patterns of life.’ I show how US Military Advisors operated as 
'embodied sensors' within the HES, producing a distinctive location-based event ontology – a 'view of 
below' – accompanied by rudimentary digital maps in-formation from incoming hamlet-level 
observation streams. I argue that acts of translating the rich texture of hamlet and village life into an 
objectified information format constituted a unique form of ‘epistemic violence,’ rooted not so much 
in the narrative subjection of the ‘Other,’ but in the pure abstraction of life into a digitally stored data 
trace. 
 
In October 1966, one year after the first American ground troops and support units arrived in southern 
Vietnam, United States Defense Secretary Robert McNamara asked the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) to design a computer-based intelligence reporting system capable of measuring military 
‘progress’ in America’s counterinsurgency war in the Vietnamese countryside. Frustrated by the lack 
of reliable intelligence, McNamara wanted a metrics-style reporting system that provided insight into 
the rural security and development conditions thought to be decisive variables for winning an 
unconventional war often characterized as ‘without fronts’ (Thayer, 1985). McNamara was impressed 
by a paper-based reporting system developed in 1965 by the US Marines as part of the their ‘civic 
action’ operations along the border of North Vietnam. In the US Marines system, data was collected 
on the political and military infrastructure of National Liberation Front (NLF) guerrillas at the village 
and provincial level, including ‘intangible’ dimensions like villagers’ attitudes towards the central 
government and the effectiveness of US development aid programs. McNamara wanted a similar 
reporting system but with a ‘higher resolution’ at the hamlet level, a scale now achievable because of 
advances in business computing. McNamara and his staff wagered that by adopting new digital data-
processing technologies to manage the growing catalog of reporting systems in Vietnam,1 American 
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military and civilian officials could, over time, better understand population dynamics and pacification 
trends in rural areas (Daddis, 2012; AUTHOR 2016).    
Following McNamara’s request, a team of private contractors hired by the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) and CIA were sent to Saigon to develop the digital hamlet intelligence system. 
The team created a reporting system based on the input and storage of hamlet and village population 
data into a database for future retrieval. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), as it came to be called, 
produced monthly statistical reports on the status of ‘population control’ in the countryside, as well 
as state-of-the-art digital maps showing the status of hamlet control by either the Government of 
Vietnam (GVN) or the NLF. By spring 1967, the HES was fully functional in the field, and stayed 
operational—albeit with several upgrades—until 1973. The HES consumed ‘thousands of man-days of 
work by countless young army officers’ (Allen, 2001: 224), making it one of the largest—and most 
labour-intensive—geographical information systems of its time.  
The Vietnam War marked an important turning point in the conduct of late-modern war because it 
was the first time computer technologies were integrated into nearly every facet of the US military 
apparatus. What difference did computers make? Starting in 1963, punch-card processing systems, 
followed in 1967 by mainframe computers with magnetic-tape storage capacity (Feltham, 2012), were 
fast becoming the vital infrastructure undergirding the full spectrum of US military violence (Cowen, 
2014). By the late 1960s, the background of America’s deadly ‘techno-war’ in Vietnam was humming 
with computer hardware (Edwards, 1997), accommodating ground-level logistical equipment for 
deadly search-and-destroy missions that were managed much like an ‘assembly line’ (Gibson, 1986). 
Computers were integral for military command and control systems; the conduct of covert operations 
(e.g., the Phoenix assassination program; Shaw, 2016); the ‘electronic battlefield’ tracking NLF north-
south movements (Gregory, 2011); and various military-civilian programs that evaluated and 
measured ‘progress’ in the US pacification campaign (Daddis, 2012). In the discussion here, I focus on 
a specific technical object hitherto unknown in war, digital population data (cf. Halpern, 2014), whose 
facility in representing ‘actual’ village and hamlet conditions on the ground became a contentious 
flash point between the anti-war movement, an increasingly skeptical US media, and the managers 
running the war.  
The Vietnam War was also a watershed for Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Database systems 
like the HES were predicated on a location-based event ontology, significant insofar as social 
geographical phenomena could be disclosed at a local level. Long before GIS systems were used to 
track insurgent movements and incidents in the ‘event-ful battle spaces’ of Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan (Croser, 2007; Gregory, 2010), drone strikes (Hall-Kindervater, 2016), or more recently to 
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track migration flows across the Mediterranean (Tazzioli, 2018), the HES and other pacification 
reporting systems were capable of translating hamlet-level population dynamics – movement, 
economic activity, NLF attacks, education and medical access – into digital visual formats that could 
be tracked in ‘real time.’  A key variable in these new digital systems was the use of a standard 
geographical reference point – Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates – assigned to 
reported activity and inputted into military computers.  As one of the HES’s key designers, CIA officer 
George Allen, notes: 
Virtually all reporting from Saigon on activities related to the war was geared to a common factor: 
geographical locale. Air strikes, enemy harassing attacks, patrol engagements, friendly and enemy 
troop dispositions, supply caches, command post locations, original homes of refugees, former 
locations of defectors and prisoners, positions of artillery units and locations of their targets, 
ambush positions, helicopter landing pads, elephant sightings, locations of province capitals, 
district towns, hamlets, outposts, major combat actions… there were separate computerized 
accounting systems for every conceivable kind of activity, including the locations of the hamlets in 
our new evaluation system. (Allen, 2001: 224-225) 
Hyper-local geo-referenced data points allowed US systems analysts to extrapolate pacification trends 
from collected data of everyday life in Vietnamese villages. Moreover, since US and Vietnamese 
officials lacked a reliable census, GIS systems like the HES became the only comprehensive record 
available on population numbers and hamlet locations in the Vietnam War (Brigham, 1970; Thayer, 
1985).  
Translating the everyday locations of activities and events into the HES was possible due to an 
underappreciated figure in the history of the Vietnam War: the US Military Advisor. US Military 
Advisors were placed in each district of South Vietnam’s 44 provinces, and were assigned the task of 
accurately reporting the conditions of hamlet populations on a monthly basis. In this article, I examine 
how they translated their observations into a computer-friendly format. Ramkin (2016) has noted how 
‘embedded subjectivity’ is now central to contemporary mapping and navigation practices, with 
technologies like GPS integrated into nearly all digital platforms and devices. The US Military Advisor, 
as an interpretive subject reporting local conditions, was an important genealogical precursor to this 
cartographic shift to embedded mapping practices. US Advisors served, I argue, as embodied sensors2 
within the new computational infrastructure in southern Vietnam. With US Advisors and Vietnamese 
counterparts assigning UTM coordinates to every reported activity, they became the decisive inputs 
that constituted the location-based ontology at the heart of the HES.  
By focusing on ‘embodied sensors,’ I draw attention to the make-up of the ‘human-machine 
assemblage’ (Holmqvist 2013; Wilcox, 2017) at work in most Vietnam-era reporting systems. The post-
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war development of electronic sensors, designed to detect movements and changes in an 
environment, were central to the tactical techno-rationalities of the US military and CIA in Vietnam. 
For example, military intelligence officers used electronic sensors to track Vietminh movements and 
supply lines along the ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’ from north to south Vietnam (Deitchman, 2008). The HES 
was designed to have the same surveillance capacity offered by sensors, but in the hamlets and 
villages of Vietnam. However, electronic sensors were obviously not capable of detecting the types of 
changes important in contemporary warfare, namely political attitudes and economic development. 
Instead, US Military Advisors were effectively trained as ‘sensors’ to report on the ‘subjective’ 
dimensions of war for the ‘objective’ digital reporting systems driven by computational statistics.  
Thus, US Advisors had the peculiar task of translating the complex, qualitative socio-political life of the 
hamlet into a quantitative ordinal score for the HES.3 The goal was to produce a monthly data point 
for every hamlet in South Vietnam that could be stored in databases. Over time, observational data 
points would accumulate, serving as raw material for statistical analysis of hamlet ‘patterns of life’ (cf. 
Chamayou 2014). This analysis, in turn, shaped military operations and economic development aid at 
the hamlet level. The embedded subjectivity of US Advisors as embodied sensors, in conjunction with 
location-based data-processing capacities of computer systems, co-constituted one another within 
the HES, each side of the ‘human-machine assemblage’ – the Advisor and the computer – moulding 
the expectations of the other.  
To be sure, the translation activity of the US Advisors was burdened by the complex power relationship 
between the US Military Advisor and the Vietnamese official he usually depended upon for 
information. US Advisors typically lacked proficiency in the Vietnamese language, making them heavily 
reliant upon Vietnamese officials/translators to convey the experiences of village and hamlet 
residents. Moreover, US Advisors had to engage in their own acts of translation. If translators always 
‘distort [their] language in order to render the original faithfully’ (Conley, 2010: 18), then the 
impossible task of Military Advisors as ‘embodied sensors’ was to faithfully adhere to the experience 
of the Vietnamese peasant—conveyed through the speech-act of the Vietnamese translator—and 
translate that experience into a machine-readable format capable of producing the actionable outputs 
of status reports and digital maps. As one would expect, these calculated spaces, as they morphed 
from translation to translation, could only maintain a tenuous relationship with the ‘reality’ they 
claimed to represent.  
However, that did not make these calculated spaces meaningless. Quite the contrary. A whole new 
way of ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott, 1998) was enacted through computer-based reporting systems like 
the HES. Indeed, the novelty of these reporting systems is apparent when one compares them to 
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Scott’s important work on the modern state. For Scott, the hallmark of modern state practice was to 
make nature and people ‘legible’ through acts of ‘simplification’—cartography, urban planning, a 
census—which numerically accounted for population and resources within a territory. The location-
based reporting systems introduced in Vietnam had a different orientation entirely. While database 
systems accounted for population and resources, the aim was not simplification but rather allowance 
for the complexity of population dynamics to be appreciated on its own terms in ‘real time,’ calculated 
through Bayesian statistical analysis. Unlike the static simplifications of the ‘view from above’ central 
to Scott’s account (e.g., manually drafted maps, aerial photography), database systems like the HES 
operationalized a distinctive view of below, accompanied by a data-driven map constantly in-
formation from the incoming stream of monthly reports by hundreds of Advisors observing South 
Vietnam’s 11,000-plus hamlets. By comparing different activities based on the common denominator 
of geographical locale, systems analysts within the US military realized they could disclose dynamics, 
trends, and even make data-based predictions in the pacification war. Of course, these capabilities 
were never realized to the extent of contemporary data analytics. Nonetheless, the system discussed 
here was an important genealogical precursor of late-modern ‘big data’ analytics.  
In this paper, I examine the emergence of embodied sensors and a computational location-based 
event ontology by focusing on the Hamlet Evaluation System. First, I discuss the design of the HES and 
the historical context that led to its implementation. Next, I explore the HES as a socio-technical-
material arrangement and how it was operationalized during the Vietnam War, focusing specifically 
on the role of US Military Advisors and Vietnamese officials as embodied sensors within the hamlet 
evaluation system. Finally, I show the novelty of the mapping system within the HES. The last part of 
the story is significant as one of the trailblazers of GIS, Harvard Professor Howard Fisher, was 
contracted by the Defense Department to develop the HES mapping system. The Hamlet Evaluation 
System was a massive undertaking. Therefore, my analysis focuses strictly on its design and 
implementation in 1966-67. However, in the conclusion, I touch on some of the problems that 
emerged in the system throughout 1967-68, particularly around issues of data quality (AUTHOR 2016) 
which eventually led to major revisions of the HES in 1969 and 1971. This article is based on extensive 
archival research at the US National Archives (College Park, MD), the Center for Military History 
(Washington, DC), and the Lyndon B. Johnson Library (Austin, TX). 
My argument has two important aims beyond the empirics presented. First, by interrogating computer 
systems such as the HES, which were designed to manage pacification and development projects, I 
problematize the assumption that security and development were distinct projects during the Cold 
War, including the narrative that the ‘security-development nexus’ is largely a post-Cold War 
phenomenon (Duffield 2001; Kaldor 2012). Rather, as I show, security and development were 
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intertwined through the digital technologies employed in the US counterinsurgency campaign in 
Vietnam.  
Second, I hope this paper serves as a catalyst for decolonizing the history of computation and 
geographical information systems. In recent years, the traditionally stodgy field of computational 
history has begun to account for the role of women and people of colour in the history of technology 
(Hicks, 2017; Light, 1999), as well as the utilization of computers outside of the global North (Medina, 
2011). However, as far as I know, the development of computational hardware and GIS for the explicit 
purpose of population control in post- and neocolonial Cold War contexts, such as Vietnam, has not 
been considered in any depth, if at all. When I ask, ‘what difference did computers make?’ in the 
Vietnam War, I am equally concerned with how acts of translating the rich texture of hamlet and 
village life into an objectified information format constitute a unique form of ‘epistemic violence’ 
(Spivak, 1988; Griffiths 2018); that is, a mode of violence rooted not so much in the narrative 
subjections of the ‘Other,’ but in the pure abstraction of life into a digitally stored data trace? This 
paper thus presents a critical contribution to the as-yet-unwritten history of computers as a 
technology of imperial violence.  
‘A system to regularize observations’ 
The HES was at once a census and an archive, a map and record of on-the-ground observations made 
by US Advisors of Vietnamese villages. The electronic computer was the apparatus that made this 
population-based system possible. The historical relationship between neo-colonial population 
control and the emergence of computers is often overlooked in scholarly literature, especially when 
compared to the extensive interrogation of paper-based censuses in colonial contexts – a biopolitical 
technology par excellence for identifying population-life processes and controlling boundaries 
between racial and ethnic groups (Legg, 2005). However, the question of biopolitical control in the 
transition from paper to computer-based census systems remains underappreciated, even though the 
‘birth’ of the computer is a consequence of the census.  
Herman Hollerith (1860 – 1929), the founder of the Tabulating Machine Company, which later became 
IBM, successfully developed calculating machine technology in 1884 for the 1890 US Census, the 
largest population data processing project of the 19th century (Campbell-Kelly et al., 2013). By the late-
1950s, punch-card computing was a routine part of administrative operations in government, military 
and business institutions, including in American colonies.4 By the late-1960s, mainframe computers 
such as the IBM/360, outfitted with advanced processing power and magnetic tape data storage, 
allowed vast amounts of information to be codified, processed, and plotted in time-evolving data sets 
more efficiently than could earlier punch-card counterparts. A new professional class of ‘systems men’ 
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(Haigh, 2001) emerged to develop ‘cybernetic’ command and control models for urban planning, 
business management, and military logistics (Light 2004). Importantly, these powerful new machines 
were capable of disclosing biopolitical relationships between seemingly disparate phenomena. 
During the Vietnam War, punch-card machines and mainframe computers became central, with 
varying degrees of success, to US intelligence efforts to control the village population in southern 
Vietnam. Digital population data produced in Vietnam – from ‘body counts’ (Tyner, 2009) to economic 
development statistics – allowed an array of generalizations to be made about trends in the 
Vietnamese countryside. In 1963-65, as US military presence grew in Vietnam, civilian and military war 
managers adopted a more ‘scientific management’ approach to combat (Gibson, 1986). Defense 
Secretary McNamara, a former CEO of Ford Motor Company and trained in statistics and economics 
at Harvard, was especially keen to apply ‘systems analysis’ to a range of military activities, from 
military budgets to combat operations (McCann 2017).  
At the heart of systems analysis was the need for information. ‘Only during this era [the 1960s],’ Haigh 
writes (2001: 18), ‘was the now commonplace concept of information as a distinct, abstract, yet 
universal and impersonal quantity first established.’ US military analysts in Vietnam were eager for 
reliable information on the rural population where, following the fall of Diem in 1963, large swaths of 
the population supported the revolutionary platform of the Vietminh and NLF (Fitzgerald, 1972).  
Computer-based reporting systems like the HES were developed to understand population dynamics 
fuelling the insurgency. These systems were designed to address three problems with US military 
intelligence and information gathering in Vietnam: 
(1) The priority placed on ‘physical security’ over population intelligence. In the first years of 
intervention by US forces, MACV5 commanders notoriously prioritised ‘physical security’ for 
the Saigon regime, which came at the expense of gaining intelligence on the NLF’s political 
infrastructure. The security metric used to indicate ‘progress’ was the ‘body count’ (see Tyner 
2009), and other conventional military measurements. As David Marr, the prominent Vietnam 
historian and former Marine intelligence officer in the Mekong Delta in the 1960s, writes: ‘My 
colonel simply wanted to know if “the enemy” was located in village “A” or village “B,” 
whether he had weapons larger than 30 calibre that would force us to fly above 1,500 feet, 
and what the weather was going to be like tomorrow. The colonel cared not a wink about the 
political “infrastructure,” the relationship of “insurgents” to the local population, or the social 
program and essential motivations of the NLF (1985: 206).’ The indiscriminate killing of 
Vietnamese peasants – suspected NLF or otherwise – to achieve a body count predictably 
failed to turn the population into a willing cast of supporters for the US/Saigon regime.   
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(2) Reliance on Vietnamese sources. MACV and US intelligence agencies knew very little about 
the situation in Vietnam outside of Saigon, especially the socio-economic factors in the 
countryside that drove large swaths of the population to support the NLF. Thus, intelligence 
officers and military personnel were reliant upon Vietnamese counterparts for information. 
However, the deterioration of order in Saigon and the countryside following Diem’s overthrow 
in 1963 shook the confidence of American officials and commanders in their Vietnamese 
counterparts (Kahin, 1986: 93-181). The American skepticism towards Vietnamese 
information, especially among lower ranks, was unsurprising given the enduring American 
racism towards the Vietnamese (Bradley, 2000). The language barrier between the Americans 
and Vietnamese aggravated an already tense relationship. In 1964, RAND analyst G.C. Hickey 
produced an insightful report on US Military Advisors in Vietnam.6 Hickey, a strong supporter 
of US involvement in Vietnam, feared the venture could be undermined by rampant racism 
among American Advisors. 
 
Many Americans, measuring the Vietnamese by their own cultural standards, are highly critical 
of their value system and some of their attitudes and behaviour patterns. They are apt to 
accuse their counterparts and other associates of being lazy, unenthusiastic, without a sense 
of urgency about their jobs and the pursuit of war in general, lacking in frankness to the point 
of deviousness, intent on ritual but uncharitable toward their fellowmen, lax about health and 
hygiene, wasteful with material. Often, they vaguely ascribe these characteristics to what they 
call the inscrutable ‘oriental mentality’ (Hickey, 1965: viii).  
 
In part, computer-based reporting systems were developed to mitigate against racist 
dispositions and interpretations by American personnel reporting on security and 
development conditions. Statistical analysis based on numbers rather than narratives was 
used to overcome cultural prejudice in intelligence reporting. In their careful design (e.g., by 
using standardized reporting worksheets; see below), reporting systems were intended to 
provide a more ‘objective’ picture of Vietnam. Moreover, statistical analysis could counteract 
the proclivities of US Advisors who, under pressure from superiors to show improvement in 
their districts, had an incentive to paint a rosier picture of the situation than the reality 
(Cooper et al., 1972a: 24). However, the reliance on statistical analysis was high as numbers 
increasingly became a substitute for in-depth cultural knowledge. As Daddis notes (2012: 50): 
‘Without solid footing in either counterinsurgency or Asian culture, [US] officials under 
pressure from McNamara opted for numbers over nuance.’ 
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(3) Long-form narrative vs. quantitative reporting.  The most important US intelligence problem 
leading to computational reporting-systems like the HES was the predominant form of 
intelligence reports; that is, as narrative-based formats. The composition and length of some 
intelligence reports could extend to hundreds pages, making them difficult for US 
commanders to digest in a timely manner. Statistical reports, by contrast, could be read 
quickly and ‘at a glance.’ Until 1967, US Advisors typed narrative situational status reports on 
provinces and districts, but these accounts were neither widely read nor systematized by US 
military personnel, including commanders. The abundance of written reports accumulated  to 
an unsustainable point, producing a confused tessellation of perspectives on the political and 
military situation in the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam.      
Already in 1962, a Kennedy administration policy staff member wrote in a US State Department 
memo:  
We have been impressed by the great disparities in impressions of observers as to the state of 
progress on attitudes and the state of government progress in the countryside.’ Probably much of 
this variation is caused by the fact that different observers see different parts of the country or 
different aspects of what’s going on. It would be desirable, if at all possible, to establish a system 
to regularize observations (Johnson, 1962; my emphasis).   
The HES was precisely that: a computerized system to regularize observations of the rural Vietnamese 
population. The power of the HES lay in its ability to systematize and centralize disparate incoming 
information sources – i.e., monthly US Advisor observations made in the field – which produced a 
powerful (if provisional) sense of coherency to an otherwise ‘messy’ guerrilla war. As one official 
working on the HES put it, ‘It is impossible to generalize about the situation in rural Vietnam without 
employing an instrument such as the HES, which develops a national mosaic composed of individual 
hamlets (Brigham, 1970: 55).’ The capacities of ‘storage’ and ‘retrieval’ of information in databases, 
combined with Bayesian statistical analysis and high-resolution computational maps portraying 
hamlet control, enacted a new way of understanding the Vietnam population. 
Making the Hamlet Information Stream 
In 1966, ‘body counts’ were still upheld as the premium metric of ‘progress’ among military 
commanders (Daddis, 2012: 87-103). However, it had lost much of its lustre among US officials, who 
began to realize that the use of force to measure enemy-attrition often worked at cross-purposes with 
assessing the popular attitudes of villagers. There was a push within the Johnson Administration by 
Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor Robert Komer, McNamara and others to re-emphasize a 
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’population-based’ counterinsurgency strategy aimed at winning the loyalty of the Vietnamese. A 
February 1966 Honolulu Conference resulted in a declaration of support by the Johnson 
Administration for the Ky government in Saigon, and the American commitment to economic 
development and counterinsurgency targeting NLF political infrastructure was reaffirmed (Fitzgerald, 
2002: 275).  
After the Honolulu Conference, US officials began to express concern about the reliability of 
population figures for South Vietnam. An accurate census was needed to gauge ‘progress’ on political 
and economic development at provincial, district, village and hamlet levels. Key questions arose such 
as: What percentage of residents in hamlets and villages are secure this month compared to last 
month? What percentage of the population use health and economic aid over the duration of USAID 
programs? For many US officials, these were critical questions for any liberal nation-building strategy 
aimed at winning an ‘unconventional’ war (Marquis 2000). A major information-gathering problem 
was caused by US military operations that continually displaced (and re-displaced) the rural 
population. By 1967, Daddis writes (2012: 125), ‘search-and-destroy missions and bombing raids had 
left homeless roughly three million South Vietnamese. American operations generated scores of 
refugees, unravelling the countryside’s social and political fabric and destabilizing any foundation on 
which pacification programs could build.’  
The task of producing a reliable census and population data fell to Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support (CORDS), a new US military-civilian pacification program established in May 
1967. CORDS’s mission was to measure security and development, and oversee ‘civic action’ 
pacification programs working in tandem with MACV offensive operations in the countryside. CORDS 
used the HES as an instrument to count and catalog the Vietnamese population, the essential data 
ingredient for calculating security and development trends at the hamlet level (Komer, 1971). If the 
HES was going to provide a ‘real time’ statistical picture of pacification programs, then a synchronous 
incoming hamlet information stream was required to feed into the system. Monthly observations by 
US Advisors became the data anchor for the HES information stream. 
The View of Below 
By late-1967, US Provincial Advisors were in place in all 44 provinces of South Vietnam, as well as US 
District Advisors in each of the 235 districts in the provinces. Every month, US District Advisors with 
Vietnamese counterparts (usually low-level military or state officials), visited every hamlet and village 
in their districts, recording security and development conditions on HES worksheets, and  submitted 
the worksheets and supplementary written materials to Provincial Advisors. Provincial Advisors 
assembled and collated the incoming worksheets and reports, and forwarded the materials to MACV 
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headquarters in Saigon for punch-card processing, statistical analysis, and database storage. In return, 
US Provincial Advisors received computer-generated HES reports based on previous month’s 
reporting, including statistics on provincial security and development changes and trends (Figure 1). 
The district and provincial-level reports produced an evolving monthly statistical understanding of 
South Vietnam, supplemented by HES maps (see below) that had a profound ‘truth-effect’ of 
portraying a comprehensive picture of the war in an ‘objective’ numerical format for US officials and 
MACV commanders. As the two lead programmers of the HES, Dorothy Clark and Charles Wyman, 
wrote: ‘the system is structured to allow computation of a nationwide indicator of progress (Clark and 
Wyman, 1967: 33).’ As I note in the conclusion, the desire within the Johnson Administration for a 
simplified metric of progress misled officials and the public on the state of the war. Nevertheless, as a 
practical tool, the monthly HES reports and maps allowed Provincial Advisors and commanders 
recalibrate or sustain tactical operations at the hamlet level.     
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Why was the hamlet the preferred scale of analysis? A primary factor was the destruction and 
deterioration of village life caused by US forces. The traditional role of the village as the administrative 
centre for collections of hamlets was severely damaged by the war (Owens 2015: 209-242). The 
breakdown of the village fragmented the population created ideal conditions for the NLF to infiltrate 
hamlets and propagandize a Communist revolutionary program. The US and GVN, realizing the 
successes of the NLF, created their own ‘Revolutionary Development’7 programs at hamlet 
populations to counteract the inroads made by NLF guerrillas.  
However, hamlet-level information and analysis was insufficient for Revolutionary Development 
programs, despite the CIA and USAID operating in hamlets since at least Diem’s failed 1962-1963 
‘strategic hamlet program’ (Attewell, 2015).  The incongruity between implementing hamlet-level 
security and aid programs without appropriate techniques for measuring their effectiveness 
frustrated CORDS officials. The HES’s scaled-down information-gathering operation remedied this 
problem (Clark and Wyman, 1967: 35). The bedrock of the HES was a separate information file for 
each of the 11,355 hamlets in South Vietnam, identified by province, district, village, and population 
count. Hamlets were given a name, and standardized GVN and US code numbers. Most importantly, 
each hamlet was assigned a UTM coordinate, which allowed socio-spatial pacification trends to be 
calculated across time and space (Clark and Wyman, 1967: 2-3). For example, GVN planners could aim 
to re-establish control in areas where population densities were high and land was cultivated, both 
signs that an insurgency presence was low (Clark and Wyman, 1967: 53). Details ranging from military 
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incidents and guerrilla attacks, to the cultivated/noncultivated land and the condition of educational 
facilities, were thus key data inputs for the HES. 
The ingenuity of the HES lied in its location-based reporting. The location-based reporting mechanism, 
which allowed for the fabrication of digital population data, was the key feature that separated 
computational systems from modernist modes of ‘seeing like a state.’ To understand the difference, 
consider what Jameson calls the ‘nominalistic dilemma’ (Jameson, 2013) at the heart of war8; i.e., the 
dissimilitude between a soldier’s ground-level perspective of war and the so-called ‘god’s eye view’ 
afforded by a ‘machine aesthetic from the air’ (Saint-Amour, 2003: 352; Bousquet 2018). Unlike the 
confused sensory experience inherent in the immediacy of combat (trenches saturated with gases, 
shrapnel, and bullets; the dense foliage of the jungle), the conceit of technological vertical distancing 
from the ground is the achievement of an ‘objective’ perspective of war (Virilio, 1989). In the first two 
World Wars, western militaries, including the United States, invested heavily in various technologies 
– aerial reconnaissance and photography, maps, balloons – to guarantee a ‘view from above’ (Haffner, 
2013). As Saint-Amour notes (2003: 356), ‘aerial photographs possessed the conceit of laying reality 
bare by their deadly accuracy, their vertical penetration, their plenitude or even excess of detail, and 
their ability to reveal facts, objects, and strategic intentions not otherwise accessible’ from the ground. 
The vertical ‘view from above’ seemed the ‘appropriate’ view for conventional wars defined by armies 
operating along fronts.  
However, such a vertical view is faced with limits in unconventional wars without fronts (Thayer 1985). 
While aerial and satellite reconnaissance remained crucial for military reconnaissance in Vietnam, 
computational systems like the HES inverted the view back to the observational experiences of 
soldiers better positioned to disclose the complex texture of everyday hamlet life.  When combined 
with the computational capacity to process and store observational data points on population 
dynamics and events, systems like the HES cut across Jameson’s ‘nominalistic dilemma’: ‘objectivity’ 
was achieved not by a ‘view from above,’ but rather by the multiplicity of US District Advisors’ sensory 
observations from the ground. This view of below – a computationally processed combination of 
hundreds of dispersed observations of Advisors – provided a unique abstracted reality of hamlet life. 
The difference in these two abstract views – from above, of below – lay in the mechanism that 
repurposed ‘reality’ for military action. If the aerial photograph’s relation to the world can be 
described as one of pictorial transcription9, then the sharp end of data produced by the rotating cast 
of US District Advisors for the HES was one of ‘factual’ translation of Vietnamese peasant life into a 
machine-readable format. Digital population data, a new ‘form of appearance’ in the 1960s afforded 
by the computer, revealed evolving and dynamic life processes in locations that were unseen in the 
static pictures of areas taken from above.  
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The view of below should not be confused with a view from below, as my point is not to rehearse the 
notion of a ‘world divided’ between high-tech military gazes in the sky and victimized ‘embodied 
subjects’ below (cf. Chow 2006). Rather, the view of below is an instrumental horizontal perspective. 
The embodied observations of US Advisors mattered only so long as they anchored recorded data 
points that were archived in databases. As I discuss below, observational data points were the raw 
material for arguably the HES’s most important output: a constantly changing map in-formation that 
translated security and development statuses into pictorial form (Figure 2). No longer was the ‘state 
simplification’ of the map oriented towards ‘permanently settl[ing]… mobile peoples (Scott 1998: 1)’ 
or ‘area control.’ The static map gave way to a map in-formation—founded on a location-based 
ontology, constituted by observational data-points—allowing the dynamics of the conflict to be seen 
by CORDS officials and commanders in ‘real time.’ . In the following, I outline HES key inputs and 
outputs to illustrate how this hamlet control system worked in operation. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
HES Inputs: Embodied Sensors 
The 1967 version of HES was heavily reliant upon US District Advisors’ observational assessments of 
hamlet conditions.10 To mitigate against subjective interpretations in Advisor information-gathering 
and reporting, HES programmers devised unique techniques that turned Military Advisors into sensors 
for the system. The quality of the HES was only as good as Advisors’ observations—which was also the 
weakness of the system.  Thus, a great deal of training effort went into shaping ways of seeing.11  
HES programmers designed two important micro-technologies to maximise an ‘objective’ 
interpretation of hamlet conditions. First, the programmers developed a matrix of six categories by 
which the security and development statuses of hamlets were qualitatively assessed: VC Military 
Activities; VC Political & Subversive Activities; Security/Friendly Capabilities; Administrative & Political 
Activities; Health, Education & Welfare; Economic Development. Within each category, three criteria 
indicators were assigned, totalling 18 indicators, which the Advisor scored from E (worst) to A (best). 
For example, under the Economic Development factor, an Advisor could score the indicator ‘Economic 
Improvement Programs (Farming, Fishing, Land Reform, etc.’ in a hamlet in the following way: 
E = None; no programs started 
D = Some planning: few basic programs started 
C = Basic programs underway; people interested 
B = More advanced programs started; increased popular support and participation. 
A = Most programs well advanced in response to popular demand and continuing participation. 
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For a secured ‘A’ hamlet, the Advisor needed to observe ‘No [NLF] incidents, including harassments, 
in village or near hamlet or on routes to village during month,’ and evaluator’s guide was developed 
to assist Advisors in scoring (Clark and Wyman 1967: 3). Every month, a single overall average score 
was calculated for each hamlet based on the 18 indicators submitted by Advisors (Cooper et al. 1972b: 
228).  
The second micro-technology was the use of a standardized worksheet to assess the six categories 
(Figure 3). In addition to scoring each indicator representative of hamlet conditions, the worksheet 
required Advisors to provide geographical information (district, village, & hamlet), hamlet number, a 
‘confidence estimate’ of reporting, and a brief written assessment of overall hamlet conditions (e.g., 
uncontested; undergoing clearing; undergoing securing; secured). The back of the worksheet included 
boxes where aspects of a hamlet (e.g., the receptiveness of villagers to US forces; corruption details; 
tax collection;  road conditions; etc.) could be recorded by Advisors. As Legere (1971: 24) notes, ‘from 
the very beginning of the HES, the system provided for some registration of adviser reaction over and 
above the lettered ratings under the specified indicators.’ 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
The scores produced from compiled Advisor worksheets were instrumental for military systems 
analysts in developing methods of pattern recognition. The results from Advisor worksheets produced 
reports that served as the primary index for US officials in Washington DC and military commanders 
in Saigon to track trends in economic development and population control on a hamlet-by-hamlet 
basis. 
The arrival of staffers with in-country experience on reporting matters from the field resulted in 
the preparation of comprehensive data tables that made it possible for the first time to deal with 
data on a time-series basis, thus exposing trends over time—including some trends in population 
control in terms of hamlets and people (Cooper et al. 1972b: 224)   
Together, the assemblage of security/development factors, worksheets, and statistical reports 
produced a twin-effect. First, they trained soldiers’ eyes and shaped observations to see particular 
features in hamlets, and filtered information from Vietnamese translators that did or did not have 
direct relevance to the criteria on the worksheets. This allowed, Advisors to translate the thick texture 
of village life into a format compatible for producing statistical analysis. Of course, the HES was not a 
neutral ‘inbox’ of hamlet observations. The system formed an observational subject in the mould of 
an embodied sensor, who, by design, could only see hamlets and villages as abstracted objects or ‘sets 
of conditions’ to be assessed. The observations of Advisors on the move from hamlet-to-hamlet 
created a feedback loop, as the computational requirements of the HES determined the mode of 
15 
 
seeing by Advisors. The programming effect was one of instrumentalized perspectival orientation, 
observational capture, and the gestural control of marking worksheets cf. Butler 2009: xi). Second, as 
a monthly composite of more than 240+ District Advisor observations, the processed worksheets 
enabled the HES programmers to establish a system—a system of regularized observations—capable 
of providing a coherent picture based on interdependent local reports. In the next section, I discuss 
how this form of epistemic violence manifested in an abstracted pictorial map format.   
HES outputs: Maps in-formation 
In late-1966, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Systems Analysis Research and Analysis 
Division, in conjunction with ARPA and the CIA, contracted the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) 
to design the HES. Initially called the Analysis of Revolutionary Development Evaluation and 
Measurement System (ARDEMS), the project was carried out by a three-person team: Dorothy Clark, 
Charles Wyman, and CIA officer George Allen12. The HES project had two tasks:  (1) to produce the set 
of indicators and hamlet control criteria discussed above; and (2) to replace hand-written reports with 
automated data-processing techniques. From the RAC team’s perspective, the use of automated 
technologies would increase the accuracy and speed of reporting, collecting, collating, and storing a 
database of hamlet conditions. McNamara demanded the new system be operational by 1 January 
1967, and the RAC team, working under pressure, designed and programmed the HES system in just 
two weeks, an incredible feat for a system that was in service for seven years (Clark and Wyman 1967: 
2-3).13  As an ARPA assessment team noted in 1972, very few major revisions were made to the initial 
HES because ‘the system turned out to have been well-designed, in spite of the crash-action that had 
attended its introduction (Cooper 1972b et al.: 231).’  
In its early days, the technology available in Vietnam did not match the RAC team’s ambitions. For 
example, magnetic-tape database storage did not arrive in Saigon until 1968 (Feltham 2012). Thus, 
the team was limited to using a Univac 1005 punch-card processing machine for the initial HES until 
the 1969 HES-70 revision incorporated an IBM/360 (Clark and Wyman 1967: 57).  The Univac-based 
punch-card processing equipment was beset with problems. Punch-cards only recorded 80 Hollerith 
data items, meaning that the information data gathered by a US Advisor in a hamlet could fit on just 
one card. Since around 11,355 hamlets were evaluated on a monthly basis, a single month’s hamlet 
information file for southern Vietnam thus consisted of 11,355 cards, posing many problems. As Clark 
and Wyman point out, punch-card processing was much slower than business computing, requiring 
‘machine-operator manpower with the attendant likelihood of the introduction of human error (1967: 
34).’ Cards were misplaced, and the Univac machines frequently broke down.  Business computers 
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allowed large masses of data to be handled, and files and reports were revised with minimal physical 
manpower. However, HES handlers would have to wait two years for the IBM/360 they desired.  
In the meantime, Clark and Wyman worked with what they had. A significant output produced by the 
HES were the hybrid digital-paper maps produced by the early machinery (see Figure 2). 
Computational HES maps were capable of representing the the security score (based on the average 
security score of the 18 indicators) for every hamlet in South Vietnam; e.g., ‘A,’ ‘C,’ and ‘V’s on the 
maps represented a single hamlet status. The cutting-edge technical mechanisms that produced a 
high-resolution maps of hamlet control, and thus a new mode of abstraction of Vietnamese hamlet 
life, were unique for their time. To do so, the RAC took a standard South Vietnam map as a background 
layer, and overlaid a 1-km2 grid over all 44 provinces (Figure 4).  
FIGURE 4 HERE 
Hamlet score inputs based on UTM coordinates were presented within the confines of the hundreds 
of grid squares, allowing for a more refined presentation of hamlet control. The RAC adopted the use 
of punch-cards (Figure 5) to code various perimeters for the map outputs. For example, taking hamlet 
control data captured on District Advisor worksheets (e.g., ‘A’ or ‘C’ statuses), a code was entered 
onto a designated punch-card column (39A, 34C), that was then processed and printed onto the 
gridded map.14  
FIGURE 5 HERE 
The mapping product that made these hybrid digital-paper maps possible was SYMAP, a program and 
printing technique developed by Howard Fisher, an early pioneer of GIS (see Wilson 2018) at Harvard 
University’s Laboratory for Computer Graphics. Fisher received a $40,000 contract to develop the map 
plotting system for the HES from Thomas Thayer, Deputy Director of Intelligence and Force 
Effectiveness in the systems Analysis and Research Division (Thayer 1967a, Thayer 1967b). The RAC 
team and Thayer were attracted to Fisher’s product because it could simplify the ‘chaotic’ incoming 
hamlet observation streams onto a single sheet of paper, the totality of the hamlet control and 
revolutionary development abstracted into a picture format that could be referenced at a glance 
(Thayer 1967c). SYMAP’s plotting technique allowed for a ‘high resolution’ representation of hamlet 
scores – all 11,355 hamlets represented on a map – which proved a significant cartographic 
transformation emphasizing locational-based points rather than areas (Cloud 2001). 
The shift from areas to location points in computational HES maps was significant for two reasons. 
First, on a military level, the HES maps addressed a long-standing criticism of US commanders that 
manually-produced area maps only represented population control at the level of the province or 
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district, rather than the village or hamlet. For a military officer, this was a significant capability in an 
unconventional pacification war where the political motivations of Vietnamese villagers matter as 
much as NLF ‘body counts.’ Hand-drawn area maps were unable to show how the Vietnamese 
population was divided between pro-Saigon and NLF forces at the village or hamlet level. By 
representing control at the level of the province and district, rather than hamlet, a ‘contested’ area (a 
‘C’ score) could give a ‘a false impression to the uninitiated of the extent of GVN influence over people 
and resources’ (Clark and Wyman 1967: 15).’ High-resolution location-based maps based on the 
hamlet observation stream scaled-down the unit of analysis, and military planners could manage the 
war accordingly at that level.  
Second, as Clark and Wyman’s report (1967: 47) reveals – although they did not frame it this way – an 
important act of erasure took place with the introduction of computational HES maps, namely the role 
of Vietnamese cartographers who were employed to manually draw area control maps for the US 
military. Prior to the HES, Vietnamese cartographers drew and redrew area control maps on a monthly 
basis by tracing paper over a master map, and plotting intelligence points onto districts or provinces. 
With the introduction of the HES, not only was the rich texture of Vietnamese hamlet life translated 
into a statistical ordinal score through computational abstractions, but the machine-produced HES 
maps slowly erased the Vietnamese cartographer’s hand from any involvement in representing 
control. In the digital process of abstraction, the world was stripped of its qualities in novel ways, 
although not without new ‘cartographic anxieties’ (Gregory, 1994). 
Conclusion 
The HES’s combination of inputs (embodied sensors) and outputs (statistical reports, digital maps in-
formation) enacted a location-based event ontology novel for its time. The HES continued to be a 
primary instrument used by US war planners to measure security and development trends until the 
American withdrawal in 1973. From a historical perspective, the operation of the HES illustrates that 
the ‘security-development nexus’ was not a post-Cold War breakthrough, but rather part and parcel 
of US military operations integrating computational systems focusing on the population. In terms of 
the history of (American) imperial violence, the ‘view of below’ obtained by the ‘embodied sensors’ 
of US Military Advisors’ observations served the purpose of translating the lived textures of 
Vietnamese hamlet life into machine-readable data points for calculation and analysis. Unlike the 
violent abstractions attained by the vertical ‘view from above,’ the view of below allowed the  
biopolitical complexities of hamlet existence – subsistence, shelter, movement – to be disclosed on 
their own terms, clearing the ground for a refined form of violence that was visited on Vietnamese 
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rural life. The modernist ways of ‘seeing like a state’ realized a perspective more acute form -- and 
thus more deadly – in the view of below in the Vietnam War.    
Despite the new ways of ‘seeing like a state’ by the HES, the numbers generated by reporting systems 
were politicized from the moment they were introduced. When the HES failed to ‘predict’ the January 
1968 Tet Offensive, metrics-based reporting systems came under intense scrutiny, specifically around 
the question of data quality. In December 1968, US Representative John Tunney submitted a report 
to the US Congress on ‘Measuring Hamlet Security in Vietnam.’ Tunney concluded it was impossible 
for the HES to produce an accurate picture for two reasons. First, the 12-month length of tour of 
District Advisors meant little training for their replacements or continuity in observations. Second, 
hamlet residents themselves were unreliable data sources for the understandable reason that they 
feared the presence of a uniformed foreign soldier asking questions about security. The act of 
cooperating with US forces could place a resident’s life at risk, especially if NLF operatives were active 
nearby. ‘Garbage in, garbage out’ was Tunney’s (1968) verdict. 
Other data quality issues plagued the system. CORDS Chief Robert Komer was pressed by American 
journalists about the quality of HES outputs at a 1 December 1967 press conference in Saigon, one 
year after the system’s introduction. The often rosy security and development picture painted by the 
HES (usually due to ‘optimistic’ Advisor scores), did not square with reporters’ experiences of the 
violent American war in Vietnamese villages. One journalist noted that over the course of 1967, 
500,000 more bodies were claimed ‘secured’ and under ‘control’ when compared to 1966 figures. 
However, the 500,000 figure mirrored the number of villagers displaced into refugee camps over the 
same period in 1967. Were HES Advisors simply counting refugees as ‘secured’? Komer did not deny 
this possibility, claiming ‘it is a matter of the definition of a refugee… If they are coming into secured 
areas [refugee camps] that does – at least on the security side – improve the secure population 
situation (Komer 1967: 12).’ Komer also did not deny the possibility that since the HES did not draw 
distinctions between military-aged men, women, and children, a hamlet could appear ‘secure’ 
because of low numbers of armed males [killed or operating elsewhere], even though the actual 
loyalties of the hamlet could be to the NLF (Komer 1967: 12-13). In 1985, George Allen, the CIA officer 
who helped design the HES with Clark and Wyman made an extraordinary admission at a Vietnam 
Intelligence conference held in McLean, Virginia, revealing that the HES never achieved an accurate 
count of hamlets and population because of the number destroyed by US forces:  
I mentioned one thing that occurred was that we started with 13,000 hamlets. I think the 
demise of 2,000 hamlets was a result of… the sort of thing the Soviets are engaged in now 
in Afghanistan. In essence, much of our military operations, and in particular our 
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bombing, tended to force the population to make a choice. Stay in the countryside and 
get killed or get the hell out and get somewhere where you are not going to get bombed. 
And where you are not going to get bombed is in the areas where Vietnamese troops are. 
That is why I think 2,000 hamlets disappeared in Vietnam and were no longer viable 
political administrative entities. It was just because they were wiped off the maps (Allen 
1985: 6-9).   
The criticisms levelled at HES data quality were significant, and resulted in two major revisions of the 
HES in 1969 (HES-70) and 1971 (HES-71). Nevertheless, the focus on data quality – i.e., was ‘reality’ on 
the ground accurately represented in HES statistical reports and maps – overlooks the technical 
armature put in place in Vietnam. The capacity of computational hardware to produce an ‘objective’ 
picture was never put into doubt by critics. Rather, the quality of data entry was the focus. However, 
the whole logistical digital-material arrangement put into operation invited the modes of abstraction 
that allowed population dynamics to be calculated on their own terms. Questioning the veracity of 
the data in this world in a machine misses the point that war managers and military commanders 
acted as if the HES accurately represented reality, and planned accordingly based on its statistical and 
cartographic outputs. As I have shown, this entailed a form of violence that is neglected in histories of 
computing and the Vietnam War. This violence, operating under the promise of ‘objective’ precision, 
instead brought an incalculable number of deaths to Vietnam’s rural hamlets.     
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1 Brigham (1970) provides a list of pacification reporting systems operated by the US Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV): Chieu Hoi Management Information System, National Police Evaluation System, 
Pacification Data Bank, People’s Self-Defense Force Management Information System, Refugee Management 
Information System, Revolutionary Development Cadre Information System, Rural Information System, Self-
Help Project Monitoring System, Territorial Forces Evaluation System, Terrorist Incident Reporting System, 
Village-Hamlet Radio System, and the Viet Cong Infrastructure-Guerrilla Forces Reporting System. 
2 The term ‘embodied sensor’ was introduced to me by Dr Andrés Luque-Ayala. 
3 My understanding of ‘translation’ in socio-technical systems is indebted to Latour (1987).  
4 As McCoy (2009) shows, technical advances in American administrative practices were exported to the 
Philippines and other former colonies in an effort to destroy various Communist-inspired movements. 
5 The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was set up in 1962 to replace the Military Assistance Advisory 
Group Vietnam. MACV, as a joint-service command, directed all military operations in the Vietnam war from 
1962-1973. 
6 Hickey’s report was based on 320 interviews with US Advisors around South Vietnam over a 10-month 
period. 
7 ‘Revolutionary Development’ was a Saigon-led program to reconstitute war torn Vietnamese society through 
American funded political and development programs. Pacification was the military component of 
Revolutionary Development. 
8 ‘War offers the paradigm of the nominalistic dilemma: the abstraction from totality [versus] the here-and-
now of sensory immediacy and confusion (Jameson, 2013: 232).’ 
9 See Cavell, 2006: 118. ‘A representation emphasizes the identity of its subject, hence it may be called a 
likeness; a photograph emphasizes the existence of its subject, recording it; hence it is what may be called a 
transcription.’ 
10 There were two revisions made to the HES in 1969 (HES-70) and 1971 (HES-71). Unfortunately, I do not have 
space here to detail these revisions. The major revision made in both systems was to strip the ability of the US 
Advisors to score hamlet conditions. Instead, Advisors’ hamlets assessments were scored centrally at MACV 
headquarters. 
11 See Daston and Galison (2007) on shaping ‘epistemologies of the eye’ to achieve ‘objectivity.’  
12 Initially, the team was in Saigon to fix an ARPA reporting system developed by Allen and others in 1964 used 
to measure ‘progress’ at the provincial level (Allen, 2001) 
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13 Around the same time, ARPA and the Stanford Research Institute developed similar system in Thailand in a 
joint project (see Weinberger 2017: 149). 
14 In the HES-70 system, a coding technique that allwoed vegetation type, population density, and secured 
area goals to be represented (Legere 1971: 29). 
